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UNITED STATES v. CHESTMAN*-
TRADING SECURITIES ON THE BASIS OF
NONPUBLIC INFORMATION IN ADVANCE OF
A TENDER OFFER
Thomas Lee Hazen**
BACKGROUND
The law should and does impose limits upon the extent to
which corporate insiders (as well as others who are in possession
of material nonpublic information) can take advantage of their
special knowledge by trading in securities.1 Although there are
some commentators who do not agree,2 the majority of observers
believe that trading on nonpublic information gives an unfair
advantage to corporate insiders and thus is properly prohibited. 3
Nowhere in either the text of the federal securities acts or in
the rules and regulations of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) is there a definition of the precise scope of illegal
trading in securities on the basis of material nonpublic informa-
tion. Nevertheless, since 1961,4 and especially in recent years,
the SEC has enjoyed enormous success in challenging improper
* 903 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990), rev'd in part, afi'd in part, No. 89 Civ. 1276 (Oct. 7,
1991) (in banc).
** Cary C. Boshamer Distinguished Professor of Law, University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill; B.A. 1969, J.D. 1972 Columbia University.
' See generally 2 T. HAZEN, TRFATISE ON THE LAW OF SccurmEs RIGMATION § 13.9
(2d ed. 1990).
2 E.g., I'O. AI am. INSIDER TRAING AND THE STOCK AIARnm (1966); Carney, Sig-
naling and Causation in Insider Trading, 36 CATm. UL. Rnv. 863 (1987).
3 See Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Fed-
eral Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L RV. 322 (1979); Cox, Insider Trading and Con-
tracting: A Critical Response to the "Chicago School," 1986 DuKE L.J. 628; Cox, Insider
Trading Regulation and the Production of Information: Theory and Euidence, 64 WAs.
U.L.Q. 475 (1986); Hazen, Corporate Insider Trading: Reawakening the Common Law,
39 WASH. & LEE L. Rav. 845 (1982); Hazen, Commentary, 36 CATHL U.L. Ray. 987, 993-996
(1987); Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the
Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REv. 1425 (1967).
4 The first successful use of the securities laws to combat insider trading took place
in an SEC administrative proceeding against a broker-dealer. See In re Cady, Roberts &
Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
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trading on nonpublic information.' In addition, in 1984 and in
1988 Congress enacted legislation aimed at increasing the effec-
tiveness of governmental enforcement efforts to both sanction
and deter insider trading6 and further created an express private
right of action for contemporaneous traders.7
In United States v. Chestman8 a three judge panel of the
Second Circuit handed down a decision presenting a narrow
view of the securities laws' reach with regard to insider trading.
Subsequently, on rehearing in banc, the full court fashioned a
broader interpretation." Specifically, Chestman addressed the
applicability of the securities laws to remote recipients of non-
public information (tippees) who trade on nonpublic
information.
I. THE SOURCES OF INSIDER TRADING PROHIBITIONS
There are two rules10 promulgated under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 193411 that have been used to combat improper
5 See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd in part
and aff'd in part by an equally divided Court, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (conviction of Wall
Street Journal reporter and friends for violations of the securities laws and the federal
Mail Fraud Act; the securities conviction was affirmed by an equally divided Court while
the mail fraud conviction was unanimously affirmed); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985) (printer violated Rule 10b-5 by trading on
nonpublic information obtained from client). The success in the courts has helped lead
to several lucrative and highly publicized settlements. See, e.g., SEC v. Kidder Peabody
& Cp., 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 811 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (settlement of more than
$25,000,000); SEC v. Boesky, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
92,991 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (settlement of $50,000,000 disgorgement of profits plus a
$50,000,000 civil penalty).
8 See The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 ("ITSA"), Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98
Stat. 1264 (Aug. 24, 1984); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (1988). See generally Langevoort, Commen-
tary-The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 and its Effect on Existing Law, 37
VAND. L. REV. 1273 (1984).
7 See The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 ("IT-
SFEA"), Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (Nov. 19, 1988); 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (1988).
8 903 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990), rev'd in part, aff'd in part, No. 89 Civ. 1276 (Oct. 7,
1991) (in banc).
'Id.
'0 In addition to the two rules discussed directly below in the text, section 16(b) of
the Exchange Act provides for disgorgement of shortswing profits by officers, directors
and ten percent beneficial owners of publicly held corporations. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)
(1988). Section 16(b), which is discussed in the text accompanying notes 62-63 infra, is a
prophylactic rule which is not dependent upon either possession or use of nonpublic
information.
11 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-781l (1988).
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insider trading. SEC Rule 10b-512 deals with fraud in the
purchase or sale of securities generally, while Rule 14e-313
speaks directly to persons who trade on the basis of nonpublic
information pertaining to a pending or anticipated tender offer.
The three judge panel in Chestman ruled that neither of these
rules applied to remote tippees. In so ruling, the panel was
unanimous as to the Rule 10b-5 issue but was split three ways
on the applicability and validity of Rule 14e-3. The full court
viewed the issues as sufficiently significant to warrant a rehear-
ing in banc. After several months of deliberations, the full court
reinstated the Rule 14e-3 convictions while affirming the panel's
rejection of the Rule 10b-5 and mail fraud claims.14 The three
judge panel was sharply divided on the Rule 14e-3 issue but at
the same time was unanimous on the Rule 10b-5 claim. In con-
trast, the full court rejected the 10b-5 claim by a narrow six to
five margin while voting ten to one in favor of reinstating the
Rule 14e-3 conviction. As these divisions demonstrate, both the
Rule 10b-5 and Rule 14e-3 claims presented difficult questions
on the federal law of insider trading.
The federal law of insider trading has been developed piece-
meal by the SEC and the courts over a period of more than
thirty years. The use of the securities laws' general antifraud
proscriptions as weapons against insider trading is a relatively
new phenomenon. There is no evidence that when Congress en-
acted section 10(b) of the 1934 Act,1 it intended to address the
problem of insider trading.1 6 Similarly, Rule 10b-5 was not
aimed directly at the problem; the rule was promulgated in one
day as an attempt to craft a regulation to cover fraud in the
purchase of securities. 17 Rule 10b-5 existed for nineteen years
22 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990). See note 15 infra.
13 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1990). See note 27 infra.
" United States v. Chestman, No. 89 Civ. 1276 (2d Cir. Oct. 7, 1991) (in bane).
' 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). For an excellent history of section 10(b), see Thel, The
Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. Ray.
385 (1990).
6 In fact, section 16(b) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)) addresse3 the issue
directly by requiring disgorgement of all profits obtained by officers, directors, and ten
percent beneficial owners of a class of equity securities subject to the Exchange Act's
reporting requirements. See Hazen, The New Pragmatism Under Section 16(o) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 54 N.CL. Rv. 1 (1975).
1" Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 prohibits fraud and material misrepre-
sentations in connection with the "offer or sale" of a security and thus cannot be invoked
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before the SEC applied it to an insider trading case. In Cady,
Roberts & Co.18 the Commission imposed sanctions against a
registered broker-dealer who, while in possession of information
concerning a planned dividend cut, directed his customers to liq-
uidate their holdings. The Commission held that this conduct
"violated [Rule 10b-5(3)] as a practice which operated . . . as a
fraud or deceit upon the purchasers."" It was explained that:
Analytically, the obligation [to disclose the information or abstain
from trading] rests on two principal elements; first, the existence of a
relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information in-
tended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the
personal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness in-
volved where a party takes advantage of such information knowing it
is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.2 0
The next significant development in the application of Rule
10b-5 to insider trading was the Second Circuit's decision seven
years later in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,2 wherein the
court held that non-insiders who were in possession of nonpublic
against someone who commits fraud in the purchase of a security. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)
(1982). As explained by a participant in the Rule 10b-5 drafting process:
It was one day in the year 1943, I believe. I was sitting in my office in the
S.E.C. building in Philadelphia and I received a call from Jim Treanor who
was then the Director of the Trading and Exchange Division. He said, "I have
just been on the telephone with Paul Rowen," who was then the S.E.C. Re-
gional Administrator in Boston, "and he has told me about the president of
some company in Boston who is going around buying up the stock of his com-
pany from his own shareholders at $4.00 a share, and he has been telling them
that the company is doing very badly, whereas, in fact, the earnings are going
to be quadrupled and will be $2.00 a share for this coming year. Is there any-
thing we can do about it?" So he came upstairs and I called in my secretary
and I looked at Section 10(b) and I looked at Section 17, and I put them to-
gether, and the only discussion we had there was where "in connection with
the purchase or sale" should be, and we decided it should be at the end.
We called the Commission and we got on the calendar, and I don't remem-
ber whether we got there that morning or after lunch. We passed a piece of
paper around to all the commissioners. All the commissioners read the rule and
they tossed it on the table, indicating approval. Nobody said anything except
Sumner Pike who said, "Well," he said, "we are against fraud, aren't we?"
That is how it happened.
Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAw. 793, 922 (1967)
(quoting Milton V. Freeman).
" 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
19 Id. at 913.
20 Id. at 912 (footnotes omitted).
21 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
[Vol. 57:595
INSIDER TRADING
information were subject to the same disclose-or-abstain rule as
articulated in Cady, Roberts. Following the Texas Gulf Sulphur
decision there was a proliferation of both private actions and
SEC enforcement actions under Rule 10b-5 to curtail insider
trading. The Second Circuit continued to expand the use of Rule
10b-5 in insider trading cases. Thus, for example, it permitted
open-market purchasers to recover from persons selling their
stock with advance knowledge of an impending earnings
decline.22
The heyday of Rule 10b-5 in the Second Circuit was
Chiarella v. United States.23 In Chiarella a financial printer
who was working on a tender offer document figured out the
identity of the target company and then purchased stock in ad-
vance of the announcement of the offer. The court held that the
printer knew that the information was nonpublic and that trad-
ing while in knowing possession of nonpublic information vio-
lated Rule 10b-5. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction,
with a majority of the Justices in agreement that the mere
knowing possession of material insider information was not suffi-
cient to trigger the disclose-or-abstain duty. However, the opin-
ion of the Court and an apparent majority of the Justices indi-
cated that if it could be shown that a defendant
misappropriated or converted confidential information that had
been given to him or her while in a position of trust or confi-
dence, Rule 10b-5 liability could attach.24 Subsequently, all of
the courts facing the issue accepted the misappropriation theory
of liability.2" When misappropriation finally reached the Su-
Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir.
1974). Accord Elkind v. Liggett & Meyers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980). The Shapiro
rule subsequently was discredited in Moss v. Morgan Stanley, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984).
588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
24 445 U.S. at 230.
11 E.g., United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd by an equally
divided Court, 484 U.S. 19 (1987); SEC v. Clark, 699 F. Supp. 839 (W.D. Wash. 1988);
SEC v. Musella, 678 F. Supp. 1060 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (same case). See also, e.g., SEC v. Ingram, 694 F. Supp. 1437 (CJ). Cal.
1988). The Supreme Court tacitly approved the misappropriation theory in Bateman
Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 313 n.22 (1985). See generally Al-
dave, The Misappropriation Theory: Carpenter and its Aftermath, 49 OHio ST. LJ. 373
(1988).
For other cases approving the misappropriation theory see United States v. Willis,
737 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (upholding indictment of psychiatrist who traded on
1991]
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preme Court, a conviction based upon misappropriation was af-
firmed by an equally divided Court."
On the heels of the Chiarella decision, the SEC promul-
gated Rule 14e-3. Rule 14e-3 provides that anyone (other than a
person making a tender offer) who purchases a security with
knowledge of a planned tender offer and knows or has reason to
know that the information is nonpublic commits a "fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative act."'27 The clear purpose of the rule
information obtained in course of physician/patient relationship); United States v. Wil-
lis, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 996 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (same case) (defendant psychia-
trist plead guilty to insider trading charges); SEC v. Peters, 735 F. Supp. 1505 (D. Kan.
1990) (misappropriation doctrine could be applied to partner of investment consulting
firm); United States v. Elliott, 711 F. Supp. 425 (N.D. II. 1989) (upholding indictment
against lawyer for allegedly misappropriating confidential client information belonging to
law firm/employer); SEC v. Musella, 748 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (employee of
printer held accountable for misappropriation), aff'd, 898 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 57 (1990). Cf. Wimberg v. Ohio Deposit Guarantee Fund, 716 F. Supp.
1043 (S.D. Ohio 1989) (duty to disclose cannot be premised on mere possession of non-
public market information; there must be a fiduciary or other similar relationship of
trust and confidence).
' United States v. Carpenter, 484 U.S. 19 (1987). In Carpenter a reporter for the
Wall Street Journal had advanced information as to the publication date of the "Heard
on the Street" column that he authored. On several occasions he tipped his roommate
and others about upcoming favorable comments that would appear in the column about
selected stocks. These tippees in turn purchased the stocks, reaping a profit when the
columns were published. The Second Circuit upheld a conviction of the columnist and
his tippees based on the fact that the columnist had misappropriated from Dow Jones
(the publisher of the Wall Street Journal) confidential information (the contents and
publication date of the columns). The Court, apparently split on the validity of the mis-
appropriation theory, (at least when applied to the facts of the Carpenter case), never-
theless affirmed a mail fraud conviction 8 to 0.
" 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1990). The rule provides in full:
Rule 14e-3. Transactions in Securities on the Basis of Material, Nonpublic In-
formation in the Context of Tender Offers
(a) If any person has taken a substantial step or steps to commence, or
has commenced, a tender offer (the "offering person"), it shall constitute a
fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act or practice within the meaning of
section 14(e) of the Act for any other person who is in possession of material
information relating to such tender offer which information he knows or has
reason to know is nonpublic and which he knows or has reason to know has
been acquired directly or indirectly from:
(1) The offering person,
(2) The issuer of the securities sought or to be sought by such tender
offer, or
(3) Any officer, director, partner or employee or any other person acting
on behalf of the offering person or such issuer, to purchase or sell or
cause to be purchased or sold any of such securities or any securities
convertible into or exchangeable for any such securities or any op-
tion or right to obtain or to dispose of any of the foregoing securi-
[Vol. 57:595
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was to avoid the impact of the Chiarella ruling that knowing
ties, unless within a reasonable time prior to any purchase or sale
such information and its source are publicly disclosed by press re-
lease or otherwise.
(b) A person other than a natural person shall not violate paragraph (a) of
this section if such person shows that,
(1) The individual(s) making the investment decision on behalf of such
person to purchase or sell any security described in paragraph (a) of
this section or to cause any such security to be purchased or sold by
or on behalf of others did not know the material, nonpublic informa-
tion; and
(2) Such person had implemented one or a combination of policies and
procedures, reasonable under the circumstances, taking into consid-
eration the nature of the person's business, to ensure that individ-
ual(s) making investment decision(s) would not violate paragraph
(a) of this section, which policies and procedures may include, but
are not limited to, (i) those which restrict any purchase, sale and
causing any purchase and sale of any such security or (ii) those
which prevent such individual(s) from knowing such information.
(c) Notwithstanding anything in paragraph (a) of this section to the con-
trary, the following transactions shall not be violations of paragraph (a) of this
section;
(1) Purchase(s) of any security described in paragraph (a) of this sec-
tion bya broker or by another agent on behalf of an offering person;
or
(2) Sale(s) by any person of any security described in paragraph (a) of
this section to the offering person.
(d) (1) As a means reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent, deceptive or
manipulative acts or practices within the meaning of section 14(e) of the
Act, it shall be unlawful for any person described in paragraph (d)(2) of
this section to communicate material, nonpublic information relating to a
tender offer to any other person under circumstances in which it is reason-
ably foreseeable that such communication is likely to result in a violation
of this section except that this paragraph shall not apply to a communica-
tion made in good faith,
(i) To the officers, directors, partners or employees of the offering
person, to its advisors or to other persons, involved in the
planning, financing, preparation or execution of such tender
offer,
(ii) To the issuer whose securities are sought or to be sought by
such tender offer, to its officers, directors, partners, employ-
ees or advisors or to other persons, involved in the planning,
financing, preparation or execution of the activities of the is-
suer with respect to such tender offer, or
(iii) To any person pursuant to a requirement of any statute or
rule or regulation promulgated thereunder.
(2) The persons referred to in paragraph (d)(1) of this section are:
(i) The offering person or its officers, directors, partners, employ-
ees or advisors;
(ii) The issuer of the securities sought or to be sought by such
tender offer or its officers, directors, partners, employees or
1991]
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possession is not sufficient to support a conviction under Rule
10b-5. In 1988 Congress gave serious consideration to adopting a
possession test but did not do so.28
Following Chiarella, the Supreme Court had occasion to
further elaborate upon the type of duty that is necessary to trig-
ger the disclosure-or-abstain obligation. The absence of a mere
possession test under Rule 10b-5 was further clarified in Dirks v.
Securities and Exchange Commission.29 In Dirks the Court held
that a tippee of inside information will not be held accountable
unless the tipper was himself or herself acting in violation of a
fiduciary duty. Dirks involved an enforcement action against an
investment advisor who had been informed by an inside
whistleblower that Equity Funding Corporation was involved in
serious accounting fraud that subsequently led to the company's
insolvency. After trying to alert the regulatory authorities, the
defendant, Dirks, advised his clients to sell Equity Funding
stock. The Court held that since information had not been
passed on to Dirks for the purpose of improper insider trading
and further since Dirks tried to aid in uncovering the fraud prior
to advising his clients, his passing on the information to his cli-
ents could not properly be said to be in violation of Rule 10b-5.
The Court explained that "a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to
the shareholders of a corporation not to trade on material non-
public information only when the insider has breached his fidu-
ciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to
the tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has
been a breach."30
advisors;
(iii) Anyone acting on behalf of the persons in paragraph (d)(2)(i)
of this section or the issuer or persons in paragraph (d)(2)(ii)
of this section; and
(iv) Any person in possession of material information relating to
a tender offer which information he knows or has reason to
know is nonpublic and which he knows or has reason to know
has been acquired directly or indirectly from any of the
above.
(emphasis added).
11 See note 75 and accompanying text infra.
463 U.S. 646 (1983).
" Id. at 660.
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II. THE Chestman DECISION
In United States v. Chestman3' a three judge panel of the
Second Circuit was called upon to examine the scope of Rule
10b-5 and the validity of Rule 14e-3. The defendant Robert
Chestman, a broker and financial advisor, met with Keith Loeb
to discuss Loeb's transfer of various brokerage accounts to
Gruntal (Chestman's employer). Loeb had numerous accounts
that he wanted to consolidate. Loeb's holdings included stock of
Waldbaum, Inc. Loeb's wife, Susan, was the niece of
Waldbaum's president and controlling shareholder, Ira
Waldbaum, who, along with his immediate family, owned ap-
proximately fifty-one percent of the outstanding Waldbaum
stock. Ira Waldbaum's sister, Shirley Witkin, owned a large
block of the family-held Waldbaum stock; her children, includ-
ing Susan Loeb, owned less than one percent. During the course
of Chestman's relationship with Loeb, Chestman executed a
number of transactions involving Waldbaum stock. During the
course of these transactions, Chestman learned that Loeb's wife
Susan was Ira Waldbaum's niece.2 Loeb claimed that he had
told Chestman that he had reliable information that Waldbaum
was going to be taken over. Prior to the tender offer's public
announcement, Chestman purchased shares for himself and for
some of his discretionary accounts. Chestman claimed that he
did not speak to Loeb until after the announcement of the
tender offer and that all of the Waldbaum purchases had been
based upon his own research. As described in Judge Miner's
opinion for the three judge panel:
In November 1986, Ira Waldbaum entered into negotiations for
the sale of Waldbaum to the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company,
Inc. (A&P). A&P and Waldbaum executed a stock purchase agree-
ment on November 21 requiring Ira [Waldbaum], as attorney-in-fact
for the Waldbaum family stockholders, to tender a controlling block
of Waldbaum shares to A&P in exchange for payment of $50 per
share. Ira told [his sister] Shirley he would tender her shares as part
of the sale .... He cautioned her "that [it was] not to be discussed"
and was to remain confidential. She turned the stock over to Ira ....
3 903 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990), rev'd in part, aff'd in part, No. 89 Civ. 1276 (Oct. 7,
1991) (in banc).
u Some of the trades required that Loeb send Che3tman a copy of his wife's birth
certificate, which indicated that Susan Loeb was the daughter of Shirley Waldbaum
Witkin. Id. at 77.
1991]
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Susan Loeb became concerned when she could not locate her
mother at home on the morning of November 24. When she spoke to
her mother later that day, her mother revealed that she had gone out
to turn the shares over to Ira. Mrs. [Shirley] Witkin told her daughter
about the impending sale and stated that "it was very important that
[she] didn't tell anybody about it because it could ruin the sale. And
that financially it was going to be a beneficial thing." She further told
Susan [Loeb] not to tell anyone except her husband. The next day,
Susan told her husband about the sale and admonished him not to tell
anyone because "it could possibly ruin the sale."
On November 26, Keith Loeb telephoned Chestman at 8:58 a.m.
but was unable to contact him. The call from Loeb and the message
"asap" was recorded on a message slip. Loeb testified that he spoke to
Chestman by telephone from his factory in New Jersey sometime be-
tween 9 a.m. and 10:30 a.m., when he left for his office in New York
City. Loeb told Chestman that he "had some definite, some accurate
information" that Waldbaum was being sold at a "substantially
higher" price than the market value of its stock. Loeb "asked
[Chestman] what he thought I should do" with the information, but
Chestman refused to give him a definite answer.
At 9:49 a.m. Chestman purchased 3000 shares of Waldbaum for
himself at $24.65 per share. Between 11:31 a.m. and 12:35 p.m.
Chestman purchased a total of 8000 shares for his discretionary ac-
counts at prices ranging between $25.75 and $26.00 per share. In-
cluded in these purchases were 1000 shares for the Loeb account. He
recorded all the discretionary account trades on his desk blotter but
did not write Loeb's name next to the trade for the Loeb account.
Loeb testified that he again contacted Chestman before 4:00 p.m.
and ordered the purchase of 1000 shares. Chestman denied having
spoken to Loeb before 9:49 a.m. and did not recall an order from Loeb
later in the afternoon. Chestman's administrative assistant testified
that Loeb called around 9 or 10 a.m., that he called a second time in
the "late morning" or "early afternoon," and that, as of the second
call, Loeb still had not spoken to Chestman.
The tender offer was announced at the close of trading on No-
vember 26, and the price of Waldbaum shares rose to $49.00 on the
next trading day. On the following Saturday, Loeb received the confir-
mation slip, feigning surprise about the purchase in the presence of
his wife."3
The jury believed Loeb's version of the facts and convicted
Chestman of violating SEC Rules 10b-5 and 14e-3. Chestman
was also convicted of mail fraud and perjury in connection with
his testimony before the SEC. The Second Circuit three judge
33 Id. at 77-78.
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panel unanimously reversed the Rule 10b-5, mail fraud, and
perjury convictions; and by a two-to-one margin reversed the
Rule 14e-3 conviction.5
A. The Rule 10b-5 Claim
With regard to the Rule 10b-5 count, the three judge panel
was unanimous in ruling that Chestman, as a remote tippee,
could not be said to have violated the rule. The inapplicability
of Rule 10b-5 was based on the absence of anything in the rec-
ord indicating that the information which Loeb had passed on to
Chestman had been given to Loeb in a position of confidential-
ity. 6 The Supreme Court's decisions in Chiarella and Dirks
With respect to the mail fraud charges, following reasoning similar to its analysis
of Rule 16b-5, the court held that "[a]fter passing through several family channels, it
cannot be said that the information was confidential to any degree or was any more than
'family gossip.' "). Id. at 80.
"Id.
As explained by the court:
Evidence that Keith Loeb revealed the critical information in breach of a
duty of trust and confidence known to Chestman is essential to the imposition
of liability upon Chestman as aider/abettor, Materia, 745 F.2d at 201, or as
tippee, Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660. Such evidence is lacking here. Although
Chestman was aware that Loeb was a member of the Waldbaum family and
may well have gathered that the "definite" and "accurate" information fur-
nished by Loeb was not generally available, there simply is no evidence that he
knew that Loeb was breaching a confidential relationship by imparting the in-
formation to him. The government can point to nothing in the record demon-
strating actual or constructive knowledge on the part of Chestman that Keith
Loeb was pledged to secrecy by Susan Loeb, who was pledged to secrecy by
Shirley Witkin, who was pledged to secrecy by Ira Waldbaum. Loeb testified
on direct examination that he could not recall describing the information as
confidential, and there is no evidence that he ever alluded to the source of his
inforiation. Cf. Materia, 745 F.2d at 202. It is impossible to attribute knowl-
edge of confidentiality to Chestman in view of the attenuated passage of the
information and in the absence of any showing that the information retained
any kind of confidentiality in the hands of Keith Loeb.
Even assuming knowledge of Loeb's duty of confidentiality on the part of
Chestman, there is no demonstration of the acceptance of that duty by Loeb.
There is presented here a chain of relationships, each link purportedly repre-
senting a pledge of trust and confidence. But there is no showing of any asur-
ance, express or implied, by any of those to whom the information was con-
fided, that confidentiality would be maintained. See Walton v. Morgan
Stanley & Co., 623 F.2d 796, 799 (2d Cir. 1980). Without more, such as a
course of dealing, a family relationship alone cannot carry an implied promise
that confidences of this kind will be maintained. Compare Reed, 601 F. Supp.
at 706 & n.32.
Id. at 79-80.
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made it clear that, without more, a tippee's use of information is
not sufficient to violate Rule 10b-5. A Rule 10b-5 violation re-
quires that the defendant be under some duty to disclose or ab-
stain from trading. The Court in Chiarella held that knowledge
that information is both material and nonpublic is not enough to
invoke the disclose-or-abstain rule.3 7 The Court in Dirks held a
tippee is not under a duty of disclosure because of the absence
of a position of trust and confidence; he or she cannot be held
accountable under Rule 10b-5 unless the tip was tainted by the
tipper's breach of such a duty.38 Chiarella and Dirks taken to-
gether thus require some basis (other than the possession of in-
formation) for invoking the alternative duty to disclose or ab-
stain from trading. This duty may be based either on the
trader's having obtained the information by virtue of occupying
a position of trust and confidence sufficient to place him or her
under a fiduciary duty or, alternatively, that the tipper's breach
of such a duty tainted the information in the hands of the tippee
trading on the basis of the information. Since neither of these
two scenarios could be said to have been the case in Chestman,
the three judge panel felt compelled to overturn the Rule 10b-5
conviction.
Although affirming the three judge panel's rejection of the
Rule 10b-5 claim, the full court was more sharply divided. Six of
the judges agreed with the panel while five did not. Judge Mes-
kill's opinion on the 10b-5 issue, in which he was joined by five
other judges,39 explained that 10b-5 liability could be based on
the misappropriation theory which requires that the defendant
have been "in breach of a fiduciary duty or similar relationship
of trust and confidence .... 2 10 After noting that entrusting
someone with confidential information does not unilaterally im-
pose a fiduciary duty, the opinion pointed out that Chestman
and his customer Loeb had been dealing at arm's length. This
led to the conclusion that the absence of a preexisting special
relationship between them precluded the conclusion that
Chestman held the information in a fiduciary capacity. The
37 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980).
'8 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 665 (1983).
"Judges Cardomone, Pratt, Miner and Altimari joined in the opinion and Judge
Mahoney concurred only on the Rule 10b-5 issue. Judge Mahoney dissented from the
14e-3 decision, sticking to the position he took while sitting on the three judge panel.
" Chestman, No. 89 Civ. 1276, slip op. at 33 (Meskill, J.).
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opinion next went on to examine whether the marriage relation-
ship was itself a special relationship so as to trigger Rule 10b-5's
disclose-or-abstain obligation. Relying on both trust law princi-
ples and securities law precedent,41 the court ruled that the fam-
ily relationship was neither a fiduciary or other special relation-
ship sufficient to invoke Rule 10b-5. The opinion explained that
fiduciary relationships are based on trust and confidence arising
out of "'reliance, and de facto control and dominance.' "42 A fi-
duciary relation therefore exists when" 'confidence is reposed on
one side and there is resulting superiority and influence on the
other.' "4 The court concluded that a family relationship by it-
self lacks the essential element of a fiduciary relationship,
namely "discretionary authority and dependency.""4 Based on
these principles, the majority opinion in Chestman found insuf-
ficient evidence to support the existence of a fiduciary relation-
ship or functional equivalent between Loeb and the Waldbaum
family. Since neither Chestman (the broker) nor Loeb (the cus-
tomer who passed the information on to him) were fiduciaries
nor in a similar position of trust and confidence, the Rule 10b-5
claims could not be upheld.
Five of the eleven judges disagreed with the majority on the
10b-5 count. The opinion by Judge Winter concluded that
Chestman's conviction could be upheld either on the misappro-
priation theory or on the tippee liability rationale embodied in
the Supreme Court's decision in Dirks.45 The dissent was of the
view that more than a mere family relationship was involved
"I Id. at 38 (relying on United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp: 685,705 (S.D.N.Y.) ("the
existence of a confidential relationship must be determined independently of a preexist-
ing family relationship"; father and son relationship standing alone was not sufficient),
rev'd on other grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985); G. BoURT, THE LAw Or TRUSTS AND
TnusTEs §482 at 300-11 (rev. 2d ed. 1978) ("mere kinship does not itself establish a
confidential relation")).
" No. 89 Civ. 1276, slip op. at 40 (Meskill, J.) (quoting United States v. Magiotta,
688 F.2d 108, 125 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983)).
43 Id. at 40 (Meskill, J.) (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Rubenfield, 72 Misc. 2d 392,
400, 339 N.Y.S.2d 623, 632 (Civ. Ct. 1972), aft'd, 77 Misc. 2d 962, 357 N.Y.S.2d 589 (Sup.
Ct. App. T. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 48 A.D.2d 428, 370 N.Y.S.2d 943 (2d Dep't
1975), alf'd, 40 N.Y.2d 936, 358 N.E.2d 882, 390 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1976)).
4 No. 89 Civ. 1276, slip op. at 41, 45-46.
45 Id. at 19 (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Winter's
opinion was joined by Chief Judge Oakes and Judges Newman, Kearse, and McLaughlin.
All five of these judges concurred in the court's reinstatement of the Rule 14e-3
conviction.
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since it was dealing with a family-owned corporation. These
facts involved not merely a familial relationship but the inter-
twining of family and business relationships in connection with a
family-controlled business. As a result of this mixed business/
family relationship, Loeb had sufficient access to inside informa-
tion so as to justify a concomitant duty not to trade on the in-
formation. As Judge Winter explained, the Rule 10b-5 disclose-
or-abstain duty should apply to a family member:
(i) who has received or expects (e.g., through inheritance) benefits
from family control of a corporation .... (ii) who is in a position to
learn confidential corporate information through ordinary family in-
teractions, and (iii) who knows that under the circumstances both the
corporation and the family desire confidentiality .... 0
The dissent is quite convincing on this point as Chestman in-
volved more than a mere family relationship. While the dissent
presents a better interpretation of the proper scope of insider
trading regulation, the majority's opinion points out the problem
with premising insider trading liability on Rule 10b-5 which was
not drafted with this end in mind. Rather than having courts
stretch rules to fit the situation, rules should be designed to
combat the problem directly. The decision in Chestman there-
fore demonstrates the need for rules and or statutes defining
more precisely the scope of what constitutes illegal insider trad-
ing. In contrast to Rule 10b-5, Rule 14e-3 is such a rule, al-
though limited in scope to tender offers.
B. The Rule 14e-3 Claim
With the 10b5. issue disposed of, the panel in Chestman
turned to the Rule 14e-3 conviction. As noted above, unlike sec-
tion 10(b), section 14(e) and Rule 14e-3 on their face are not
limited to fraud (thus requiring an independent basis for a duty
to disclose) but rather premise the violation upon knowingly
trading while in possession of material nonpublic information
about a pending tender offer.
Each of the three judges in Chestman took a different ap-
48 Id. at 21-22 (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In the instant
case, Loeb expected stock via gift. The opinion criticized the majority for indicating that
something more in the way of a formal contract or business arrangement is necessary to
impose a duty on family members and that by doing so the court was treating family
members no differently from persons dealing purely at arm's length.
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proach to Rule 14e-3. Judge Miner, who wrote the three judge
panel's opinion on the Rule 10b-5 issue, would have held that,
unlike Rule 10b-5, Rule 14e-3 does not require a breach of a fi-
duciary duty. According to Judge Miner, Rule 14e-3 requires
more than a showing of "mere possession" of information by the
defendant.47 However, he would have sustained the conviction
since the prosecution established "that the trader [knew], or
[had] reason to know, that the information [was] material and
nonpublic and derive[d] directly or indirectly from an insider."4 8
Judge Mahoney agreed that Rule 14e-3 does not require breach
of a fiduciary duty but reasoned that since that requirement is
imposed by section 14(e) of the Act, the rule is invalid. He relied
in part on the Supreme Court's decision in Schreiber v. Burling-
ton Northern, Inc.,'9 which held that, as is the case with section
10(b) (and therefore Rule 10b-5), section 14(e) can be violated
only if the conduct complained of is deceptive. Judge Carman
agreed with Judge Mahoney that section 14(e) requires more
than Rule 14e-3 on its face would require. Specifically, the de-
ception requirement means that the conduct complained of must
be fraudulentY' Judge Carman voted to reverse the Rule 14e-3
conviction because of the trial judge's failure to instruct the jury
on the elements of fraud:
The failure to instruct on all the elements of fraudulent nondisclo-
sure, including that the defendant possessed a mental state embracing
an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud, that is, that the defend-
ant knew he had a duty to disclose and intentionally failed to do so, is
4' 903 F.2d at 84.
48 Id. (emphasis in original).
"9 472 U.S. 1 (1985).
11 903 F.2d at 87-88:
As a general matter, fraud requires proof of the elements of scienter, See
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663 n.23 (1983) ("Scienter - 'a mental state em-
bracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud,' Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193-194, n.12 (1976) - is an independent element of
a Rule 10b-5 violation."), and breach of duty. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228. Fraud
in the context of a failure to disclose under the securities lazv requires a show-
ing that the accused has violated an affirmative duty to speak. Id. at 235
("When an allegation of fraud is based upon nondisclosure, there can be no
fraud absent a duty to speak.").
See also, e.g., Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985) (deceptive con-
duct is precondition to a rule 14(e) violation; manipulative has same meaning in 14(e) as
it has in 10(b)); Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (deceptive con-
duct is a precondition for a rule 10b-5) violation.
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in my opinion fatal to his conviction."1
Thus, it was reasoned that the conviction had to be reversed due
to the failure to instruct the jury on all the elements of fraud.
Following the decision of the three judge panel, Rule 14e-3 could
be violated only when defendants use nonpublic information
knowing that they are under a duty to disclose or abstain from
trading. As such, the ruling of the three judge panel severely
limited the availability of Rule 14e-3 to remote tippees.
The correctness of the panel's decision in Chestman de-
pends upon the breadth of section 14(e) since, as written, Rule
14e-3 clearly purports to cover the broker's transactions that
formed the basis for the conviction. Section 14(e) outlaws mate-
rial misstatements and omissions as well as deceptive or manip-
ulative acts in connection with a tender offer; the section also
contains a grant of rulemaking authority:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement
of a material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order
to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under
which they are made, not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any
tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of
security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request
or invitation. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this subsec-
tion, by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably
designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, de-
ceptive, or manipulative.2
The scope of section 14(e) has been considered by the Supreme
Court. In Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc.53 a target com-
pany's management's renegotiation of the terms of a tender offer
was challenged as having been manipulative and therefore in vi-
olation of the Act. The Supreme Court ruled that section 14(e)
is limited to deceptive conduct and since there was no misrepre-
sentation or actionable nondisclosure in connection with the al-
leged manipulation, the Act was not violated. In so ruling the
Court used its judicial eraser to eliminate the term "manipula-
tive" from the statute.5" The Court further made it clear that
903 F.2d at 88.
2 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1988) (emphasis added).
53 472 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1985).
For a fuller discussion of the Schreiber decision and its implications, see 1 T.
HAZEN, supra note 1, § 11.15, at 718-19.
[Vol. 57:595
INSIDER TRADING
section 14(e) was to be narrowly construed. In the course of its
opinion in Schreiber, the Court noted that the concept of "ma-
nipulative" in section 14(e) is coextensive with the meaning of
that term as used in section 10(b)."0 The Court's reliance on pre-
vious holdings under section 10(b) has powerful implications for
Rule 14e-3. If the duty to disclose and scienter requirements
that apply to insider trading cases under Rule 10b-5 apply
equally to section 14(e) and Rule 14e-3,0a the panel's ruling is
arguably correct. Under such a construction, presumably, Judge
Carman's opinion which would read fraud into the rule is a pref-
erable approach to the one taken by Judge Mahoney who would
have invalidated the rule.
The Supreme Court has taken a similar approach to Rule
10b-5 which, inter alia, purports to prohibit material misstate-
ments in connection with a purchase or sale of a security. 7 For a
long time, a number of courts held that negligent conduct could
form the basis of a Rule 10b-5 violation."' However, in Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder,59 the Court held that although Rule 10b-5
on its face might seem only to require negligence, since the stat-
ute speaks only of a "manipulative or deceptive device or contri-
vance," 60 those terms must be read into the rule, thus requiring
a showing of scienter. Just as the Court in Hochfelder did not
invalidate Rule 10b-5(2) and (3) because of the absence of an
express limitation in scope to deceptive conduct, Judge Maho-
ney's wholesale invalidation of Rule 14e-3 is equally
inappropriate.
It does not follow from the Rule 10b-5 cases that the rever-
sal of Chestman's conviction was mandated by the statutory lan-
guage. Judge Miner's position-that Rule 14e-3 does not require
a showing of fraud-can be supported by the language of section
65 472 U.S. at 7-8.
"See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); United States v. Chiarella, 445 US. 222
(1980); notes 23-26 and accompanying text supra.
57 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(2) (1990).
See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. de-
nied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (holding that a negligently drafted press release containing
materially misleading information violated Rule 10b-5). Cf. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680
(1980) (holding that subsection (2) and (3) of section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933
(15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)) can be violated by negligent conduct). See generally 2 T. HA=N,
supra note 1, § 13.4.
425 U.S. 185 (1976).
" 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
1991]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
14(e). Section 14(e) empowers the SEC not only to define
"fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative" conduct; it also gives
the Commission the power to "prescribe means reasonably
designed to prevent, such acts and practices .... ,61 This
should be taken to mean that in prescribing such means the
Commission can cast a wide net that might catch conduct which
itself is not fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative, so long as the
Rule is "reasonably designed to prevent" such conduct. As the
ruling by the full court in Chestman recognized, this language is
in contrast to that of section 10(b) of the Act which merely gives
the Commission the power to define the scope of deceptive and
manipulative conduct but does not contain the additional grant
of authority contained in section 14(e).
Congress has been known to cast such a wide net in order to
prohibit abusive insider trading. Consider for example, section
16(b) of the Exchange Act which was enacted "[flor the purpose
of preventing unfair use of information which may have been
obtained by an insider from his or her company. '6 2 In order to
effectuate this stated purpose, section 16(b) provides that all
profits realized by ten percent beneficial owners, officers, and di-
rectors, from purchases and sales (or sales and purchases) within
a six-month period may be recovered by the corporation. Section
16(b) requires disgorgement even though there was no actual use
of information. Congress believed that this prophylactic section
was necessary to prevent abuse. The language of section 14(e)
should be similarly read to grant the SEC the power to promul-
gate prophylactic rules so long as they are reasonably designed
to catch fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative conduct within
the meaning of that section. Rule 14e-3 is just such a rule.
On rehearing, Judge Mahoney remained true to his position
in the panel decision and stood alone among the eleven judges in
calling for reversal of the Rule 14e-3 conviction. 4 The majority
relied on both the statutory language and legislative history in
ruling that Rule 14e-3 does not require a showing of fraud. The
court began by pointing out that the last sentence of section
61 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1988) (emphasis added).
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988).
' See generally 2 T. HAZEN, supra note 1, § 12.3 & n.3.
No. 89 Civ. 1279, slip op. at 1 (Mahoney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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14(e) gives the SEC broad prophylactic rule-making authority
and that "[t]his delegation of rule-making responsibility be-
comes a hollow gesture if we cabin the SEC's rulemaking author-
ity .. .by common law definitions of fraud." 5 The opinion
drew support for this conclusion from the fact that the language
of section 14(e) does not parallel section 10(b) wherein the fraud
requirement is found, but more closely resembles section
15(c)(2)66 which governs broker-dealer practices in the over-the-
counter markets. Although the Supreme Court in Schreiber v.
Burlington Northern, Inc. analogized 14(e) to section 10(b)
when imposing the deception requirement, that decision also
noted the difference between the two sections, in that the last
sentence of section 14(e) "gives the [SEC] latitude to regulate
nondeceptive activities as a 'reasonably designed' means of
preventing manipulative acts ... ." The Second Circuit thus
properly concluded that the clear language of section 14(e) does
not impose a fraud requirement on Rule 14e-3. The court drew
further support for its conclusion from the legislative history of
recent insider trading legislation. In the deliberations underlying
the enactment of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 and
the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of
1988, there is evidence that Congress was aware of the broad
reach of the language of Rule 14e-3 and its effect.6
In reinstating the Rule 14e-3 conviction, the Second Circuit
properly avoided an unduly narrow interpretation of the Su-
preme Court's decision in Schreiber. Section 14(e) was designed
to enable the SEC to curb manipulative and deceptive practices
in connection with tender offers. Rule 14e-3 as applied in
Chestman is reasonably designed to prevent such conduct.
II. IMPLICATIONS
One of the purposes in promulgating Rule 14e-3 was to
avoid the Rule 10b-5 requirement, as announced in Chiarella,
"Id. at 13 (Meskill, J., opinion).
e 15 U.S.C. §78o(c)(2) (1988).
"472 U.S. 1, 11 n.11 (1985) (quoted in No. 89-1279, slip op. at 25 (e3kii, J.,
opinion)).
"No. 89-1279, slip op. at 17-18 (Meskill, J., opinion) (citing HR. Rn. No. 355,98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 11, 13 n.20, reprinted in 1984 US. CODE CONG. & AD!= i. N.ws 2274,
2277, 2284, 2286 n.20; H.I& REP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2nd Sem. 14, reprinted in 1983
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmN. NEws 6043, 6051).
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that there be some basis for a duty to disclose other than the
knowing possession of nonpublic information. The decision of
the three judge panel in Chestman would have eliminated that
advantage.
The Chestman decision reiterated the holding of the Su-
preme Court in Dirks, that for a remote tippee to be held liable
under Rule 10b-5, there must be evidence that he or she traded
while knowing that the nonpublic information was in fact confi-
dential. Chestman does not, however, change the rule that some-
one who is not an insider may nevertheless be held liable for
trading on confidential information when the trader acts in
breach of a fiduciary duty. In United States v. Willis6 9 a psychi-
atrist was indicted under Rule 10b-5 for allegedly trading on in-
formation obtained from a patient in the course of treatment.
The patient was the spouse of a noted corporate executive who
was considering becoming chief executive officer of BankAmerica
Corporation. Armed with this information, the psychiatrist pur-
chased BankAmerica stock. The court upheld the indictment
since the psychiatrist received the information while in a posi-
tion of trust and confidence and breached that trust when he
acted on that information for his personal benefit. Following the
panel decision in Chestman, the psychiatrist argued that since
he was not directed to keep the information confidential, he
could not be said to have violated any duty. The court rejected
that argument, reasoning that the information that was passed
on to the psychiatrist was confidential by its very nature and
thus he was not a remote tippee but rather was the one who
breached a position of trust.7 0 Based on the Supreme Court pre-
cedent as set forth in Chiarella and Dirks the existence of a fi-
duciary or comparable duty is the essence of Rule 10b-5's dis-
close-or-abstain rule. Within this context, the Willis decision
09 737 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
70 Id. at 275:
Chestman does not require a holding in this case that it is necessary for a
patient to tell her treating psychiatrist that he should not disclose information
confided to him by her in the course of her treatment .... By revealing the
information to her psychiatrist in the course of treatment, Mrs. Weill did not
breach the duty of trust and confidence which she owed to her husband. Ac-
cording to the allegations of the Indictment, it was only the defendant Willis
who breached a duty of trust and confidence by misappropriating valuable
nonpublic confidential information acquired by him in the psychiatrist-patient
relationship.
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makes sense, as does Judge Meskill's decision in Chestman.
Such results, however, highlight the fact that Rule 10b-5 is an
imperfect weapon to combat the pernicious practice of trading
on the basis of nonpublic material information. As Chestman
also shows, Rule 14e-3 may serve as a substitute weapon in some
instances.
The Willis decision points to the extent to which the securi-
ties laws have been stretched. Since there is no statutory defini-
tion of what constitutes improper trading on nonpublic informa-
tion, the courts have been forced to rely on the general antifraud
provisions. Since those provisions are based in fraud, there must
be some breach of an independent duty. However, as the Willis
decision points out, the duty need not be one connected to the
corporation or to securities. Whatever the purpose of Congress
in enacting sections 10(b) and 14(e), it cannot seriously be con-
tended that it was concerned with preserving the integrity of the
psychiatrist-patient relationship. Nor, as Chestman points out,
was Congress addressing the sanctity of marriage and family.
Similarly, Congress was not concerned with the sullying of in-
vestment banking firms' reputations. 1 On the other hand, the
activity in the Willis case, like that in the Chestman case,
should be condemned as an interference with the integrity of the
market. 2 Unless and until Congress bites the bullet and defines
the scope of improper insider trading, 10b-5 decisions as dispa-
rate as Willis and Chestman will continue to proliferate.
The commentators are divided on the question of whether a
7 In United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
863 (1983), Newman, the head of a major brokerage firm's over-the-counter trading de-
partment, received a tip from two investment bankers concerning impending takeovers
that they were working on. Newman purchased the target company stock in advance of
the tender offer announcement and subsequently sold for a profit. The Second Circuit
held that Newman conspired with the investment banking firms to misappropriate confi-
dential information from those firms' clients:
By sullying the reputations of [the investmen bankers] as safe repositories of
client confidence, appellee and his cohorts defrauded those employers as surely
as if they took their money... [the defendant] also wronged [the investment
bankers'] clients, whose takeover plans were keyed to target company stock
prices fixed by market forces, not artificially inflated through purchases by
purloiners of confidential information.
664 F.2d at 17.
"See, e.g., Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the
Federal Securities Laws, 93 HAv. L. REv. 322 (1979).
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more precise definition is needed."3 In 1987 Congress began to
consider legislation that would not only have defined illegal in-
sider trading to encompass the misappropriation theory but also
would have contained a remedy for investors in the open market
on the other side of the illegal trades. In adopting the 1988 in-
sider trading legislation, 4 Congress considered adopting a defi-
nition of what constitutes improper trading on inside informa-
tion. There was some movement to expand the misappropriation
theory by outlawing trading while in possession of material, non-
public information. It was alternatively proposed that a posses-
sion test was too broad and the prohibition should be limited to
the improper use of the information. Nevertheless, as was the
case in 1984, the attempt to legislatively define insider trading
was dropped and the statute was enacted without any such defi-
nition.75 However, in the legislative history, there is a clear en-
7' See, e.g., Symposium, Defining "Insider Trading", 39 ALA. L. REV. 337 (1988). See
also, e.g., Wolfson, Trade Secrets and Secret Trading, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 95 (1988).
74 The legislation specifically addressed a number of enforcement issues. Under the
Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA) a court can
impose ITSA penalties on a controlling person of a primary violator only if: (1) the con-
trolling person knew or acted in reckless disregard of the fact that the controlled person
was likely to engage in illegal insider trading and (2) the controlling person failed to take
adequate precautions to prevent the prohibited conduct from taking place. 15 U.S.C. §
78u-l(b)(1)(A). In addition, broker-dealers are specifically directed to establish, main-
tain, and enforce written policies designed to prevent insider trading violations by their
employees. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(f). A similar provision exists for investment advisers. 15
U.S.C. § 80b-4A.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of ITSFEA is its applicability to private en-
forcement. Section 21A(e) of the Exchange Act now permits the payment of a bounty of
up to ten percent of the penalty to private individuals who provide information leading
to the imposition of the penalty. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(e). ITSFEA also created an express
private right of action for contemporaneous traders. Section 20A of the Exchange Act
now provides that anyone violating the Act or SEC rules while trading in possession of
material, nonpublic information shall be liable to contemporaneous traders trading on
the other side of the insider trader's transactions. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1(a). Thus, if the viola-
tor is selling, all contemporaneous purchasers can sue while if the violator is purchasing,
all contemporaneous sellers can sue. Damages in such an action are limited to the profits
or losses avoided by the illegal transactions and are to be diminished by any disgorge.
ment (as opposed to penalty) ordered in an SEC action under ITSA. Id.
75 See REPORT OF THE COMA. OF ENERGY AND COMMERCE, H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmiN. NEWS 6048:
While cognizant of the importance of providing clear guidelines for behav-
ior which may be subject to stiff criminal and civil penalties, the Committee
nevertheless declined to include a statutory definition in this bill for several
reasons. First, the Committee believed that the court-drawn parameters of in-
sider trading have established clear guidelines for the vast majority of tradi-
tional insider trading cases, and that a statutory definition could potentially be
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dorsement of the misappropriation theory as recognized by the
Second Circuit.7 6 It is to be hoped that Congress will eventually
enact legislation containing a definition of illegal insider trading
that is based on a "possession" test and thereby finally put these
issues to rest.
narrowing, and in an unintended manner facilitate schemes to evade the law.
Second, the Committee did not believe that the lack of consensus over the
proper delineation of an insider trading definition should impede progres on
the needed enforcement reforms encompassed within this legislation. Accord-
ingly, the Committee does not intend to alter the substantive law with respect
to insider trading with this legislation. The legal principles governing insider
trading cases are well-established and widely-known.
78 Id. at 10, reprinted in US. CODE CONG. & ADmmN. NEws at 6047 ("[Ihe misap-
propriation theory clearly remains valid in the Second Circuit... but is unresolved
nationally. In the view of the Committee, however, this type of security fraud should be
encompassed within Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5."). See Weis3 & Spolan, Preuenting
Insider Trading, 19 Rev. Sec. & Comm. Reg. 233 (1987) (urging institutional guidelines
and policies).
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